Moral dilemmas are not a local issue

Philosophy 75 (2):245-263 (2000)
It is sometimes claimed that the Kantian Ought Implies Can principle (OIC) rules out the possibility of moral dilemmas. A certain understanding of OIC does rule out the possibility of moral dilemmas in the sense defined. However I doubt that this particular formulation of the OIC principle is one that fits well with the eudaimonist framework common to ancient Greek moral philosophy. In what follows, I explore the reasons why Aristotle would not accept the OIC principle in the form in which it rules out the possibility of moral dilemmas.
Keywords Nussbaum  Hart  Aeschylus Agamemnon
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100000279
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Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Byron Williston (2006). Blaming Agents in Moral Dilemmas. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):563 - 576.

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