Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics

Oxford University Press (1998)
In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument and, indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct.
Keywords Mathematics Philosophy  Platonists
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Reprint years 2001
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Call number QA8.4.B345 1998
ISBN(s) 0195143981   9780195143980  
DOI 10.2307/3071098
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Kristie Miller (2010). Contingentism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.

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