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- Mark Balaguer (2000). Reply to Dieterle. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3).In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity.
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Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Mark Balaguer attempts to show that there is (1) one and only one defensible version of platonism, (2) one and only one defensible version of anti-platonism, and (3) no fact of the matter as to which is true. His arguments depend essentially on the notion of supervenience, yet he rejects metaphysical necessity. I argue that he cannot use logical, conceptual, or nomological necessity to explicate supervenience. Balaguer must either give up the arguments that make use (...)
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