Online research in philosophy

In consciousness research, two rival sets of theories can be recognized: (A) Scientific material interpretations of consciousness are based on axioms that view consciousness in the context of highly advanced intentional processing of information in which subject-object relations evolve, and (B) humanistic interpretations of consciousness are based on axioms that view consciousness in the context of, say, "centered pulsations" that enable a conscious agent to act from his or her center of awareness. In this paper I will argue for the selection of axioms that favor humanistic interpretations of consciousness.

This is not just another book about consciousness: it takes the subject of consciousness forward, out of the impasse into which it has come.

Postmodernists have been suspicious of the term 'consciousness,' because it seems to suggest the existence of a separate ego-subject, standing over again an object which it 'represents,' and to neglect the sense in which this subject-object relation is an artificial creation of modernity (Globus 1994). The modernist notion of consciousness, which seems to presuppose such a bifurcated subject-object relation, has led to the need to choose between a mind-body dualism and its equally problematic alternative, reductionistic physicalism; it has encouraged naive-objectivist epistemologies such as empiricism and logical positivism; it leads to misunderstandings of the 'unconscious' and the role of unconscious hermeneutic contributions to the ways people experience reality; it exacerbates the problems of self-absorbed egoism, socio-political atomism, and the attendant unworkable contractarian approaches to political theory; and these are just a few of the worst problems that arguably can be blamed on the subject-object paradigm and the related notion of individual consciousness.

In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for denying the dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness apply only to transitive self-consciousness.

I question whether it is completely accurate to think of the philosophical meaning of consciousness as being switched-on or switched-off. It may be that, once consciousness is switched-on, it is then found in degrees in animals we deem conscious. In which case, consciousness is more like a switched-on rheostat, rather than a simple on-off switch. Christian de Quincey (2006) gives a list of what would be considered the marks of consciousness, including 'experience, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, or mentality of any kind'. He also seems to conflate awareness with experience when speaking about the light of consciousness being on. In keeping with de Quincey's desire to get clear about the meaning of consciousness, I will put forward an idea of consciousness as the experience of oneself as a being subject to past, present, and future events, and contrast this idea with a state of awareness. De Quincey claims that 'any entity that is a subject -- that feels its own being -- possesses consciousness'. I want to add to this meaning of consciousness by noting the subject's sense of temporality, so as to further qualify the meaning of consciousness and show how awareness is distinct from consciousness.

The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess' (like in Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness). Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness.

CHAPTER I The Problem I have been accused of denying consciousness, but I am not conscious of having done so. Consciousness is to me a mystery, ...

My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories of consciousness are trying to answer a question that isn't there.

On the surface the concept of self-consciousness would seem to be understandable as consciousness of oneself. It is commonplace to resist this temptation by arguing that the self cannot properly be construed as the object of this form of consciousness. It is the subject. However, in this paper I show that any effort to see the self as the subject of consciousness converts it, willy nilly, into an object.Self-consciousness is not to be understood by determining the logically appropriate role of the self in a univocal kind of consciousness. It differs from ‘ordinary’ consciousness because of the need for it to be unmediated and direct. If, on the one had, one is conscious of something, it is possible for that awareness to be indirect and mediated. On the other hand, if one is self-conscious it is necessary for that awareness to be direct.