There are no phenomenal concepts

Mind 118 (472):935-962 (2009)
Abstract
It has long been widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents, and in particular offer an explanation of Mary’s predicament in the situation exploited by Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. I reject the orthodox view; I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Ball (2007). Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
Tyler Burge (1986). Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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