American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):295 - 309 (2005)
|Abstract||On the B-theory of time, the experiences we have throughout our conscious lives have the same ontological status: they all tenselessly occur at their respective dates. But we do not seem to experience all of them on the same footing. In fact, we tend to believe that only our present experiences are real, to the exclusion of the past and future ones. The B-theorist has to maintain that this belief is an illusion and explain the origin of the illusion. The paper argues that this cannot be properly done unless one rejects endurantism in favor of the stage view of persistence.|
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