David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21 (2009)
This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.
|Keywords||Determinism Libertarianism Free will Neural determinism Psychological determinism|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
J. S. Bell (2004 ). On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox. In Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge University Press 14--21.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
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