Russell Redux: Russell's Hypothesis and Enhanced Physicalism

Abstract This paper proposes a form of Russellian enhanced physicalism which complements standard physicalism by retaining all of the structure of physics while making room for sensory phenomenology. Features of enhanced physicalism include: attention to the concrete instantiations of physical properties; articulation of a posteriori physicalism; articulation of macro-causation among large and complex shaped configurations of neurons, instantiated by sensations; and strong denials of a priori physicalism, panpsychism, and epiphenomenalism.
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