Neutral Monism Reconsidered

Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187 (2010)
Abstract
Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation
Keywords neutral  monism  Russell  physicalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Erik C. Banks, Neutral Monism Reconsidered
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.

View all 31 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-06-24

Total downloads

814 ( #90 of 1,102,971 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

154 ( #218 of 1,102,971 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.