Neutral Monism Reconsidered

Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187 (2010)
Abstract
Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then considers recent neo-Russellian versions in the second half. The chances for a revival of neutral monism are probably slight; its key ideas and starting points lie far from those in contemporary philosophy of mind. A better route might be through the philosophy of science and a deeper understanding of causation
Keywords neutral  monism  Russell  physicalism
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    Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.

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