Russell's hypothesis and the new physicalism

Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 6 (2009)
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Abstract

Bertrand Russell claimed in the Analysis of Matter that physics is purely structural or relational and so leaves out intrinsic properties of matter, properties that, he said, are evident to us at least in one case: as the internal states of our brains. Russell's hypothesis has figured in recent discussions of physicalism and the mind body problem, by Chalmers, Strawson and Stoljar, among others, but I want to reject two popular interpretations: 1. a conception of intrinsic properties of matter as categorical properties and 2. a fallacious line of descent argument that attributes pan-psychist or proto-experientialist properties to matter by analogy with human minds. Instead, I think Russell's hypothesis points us toward 1. a doctrine of concretely instantiated dispositions in matter and 2. selectively instantiated relations.

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Erik C. Banks
Wright State University

Citations of this work

Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.

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