Social justice: Defending Rawls' theory of justice against Honneth's objections

Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (1):95-118 (2011)
Abstract
This article argues that Honneth’s ‘plural conception of justice’, founded on a theory of recognition, does not succeed in distancing itself from Rawls’ liberal theory of justice. The article develops its argument by evaluating three major objections to Rawls’ liberalism raised by Honneth in his recent articles on justice: namely, first, that the parties responsible for choosing principles of justice are too individualistic and their practical reasoning too instrumentalist; second, that by taking as its ‘object-domain’ the negative liberty of persons, Rawls’ theory fails to promote the actual realization of liberty; and finally, that Rawls’ method of principle justification undermines the ‘priority’ of its Kantian ‘formality’ by presupposing a substantive commitment to a conception of individual good. Arguing that Honneth’s interpretation of Rawls’ theory contains important errors, the article concludes that both theories share the basic intention of securing for all citizens the material and institutional conditions for the actualization of otherwise merely formal liberties or, in Honneth’s terms, mutual self-realization
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Fabienne Peter (2009). Rawlsian Justice. In Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press. 433--456.
Larry A. Alexander (1985). Fair Equality of Opportunity. Philosophy Research Archives 11:197-208.
Percy B. Lehning (1998). The Coherence of Rawls's Plea for Democratic Equality. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (4):1-41.
Philip Pettit (1974). A Theory of Justice? Theory and Decision 4 (3-4):311-324.
Ivar Labukt (2009). Rawls on the Practicability of Utilitarianism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):201-221.
Wei Xiaopin (2008). Distributive Justice, Injustice and Beyond Justice. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:857-872.
Dong Jin Jang (2008). Rawls and Natural Justice. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 29:31-43.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-19

Total downloads

57 ( #27,828 of 1,102,741 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #46,741 of 1,102,741 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.