Williams James' Direct Realism: A Reconstruction

History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (3):271-291 (2013)
William James' Radical Empiricist essays offer a unique and powerful argument for direct realism about our perceptions of objects. This theory can be completed with some observations by Kant on the intellectual preconditions for a perceptual judgment. Finally James and Kant deliver a powerful blow to the representational theory of perception and knowledge, which applies quite broadly to theories of representation generally.
Keywords James, William  Kant  Direct Realism  Epistemology
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