A Refutation of Frege's Context Principle?

Thought 1 (1):26-35 (2012)
Abstract
This paper explores the limitations of current empirical approaches to the philosophy of language in light of a recent criticism of Frege's context principle. According to this criticism, the context principle is in conflict with certain features of natural language use and this is held to undermine its application in Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that this view is mistaken because the features with which the context principle is alleged to be in conflict are irrelevant to the principle's methodological significance for our understanding of the role of analysis in analytic philosophy
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,074
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Richard Heck (2000). Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):187-209.

View all 8 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Joongol Kim (2011). Frege's Context Principle: An Interpretation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):193-213.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). A Fregean Principle. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-03-02

Total downloads

43 ( #39,131 of 1,101,579 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #19,924 of 1,101,579 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.