A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument

Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427 (2013)
Abstract
Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument
Keywords Indispensability  Ontological commitment  Platonism  Nominalism  Truthmakers
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