Behavioral Pragmatism Is A-Ontological, Not Antirealist: A Reply to Tonneau

Behavior and Philosophy 33:67 - 79 (2005)
Tonneau attributes an antirealist position to my writing. In my reply I argue that my position is not antirealist, but a-ontological. I subsequently consider the implications of Tonneau's core arguments in light of my a-ontological position and find that his claims do not apply to my work. Finally, I suggest an a-ontological approach to the realism controversy.
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DOI 10.2307/27759509
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