David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199 (2010)
I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism.
|Keywords||faultless disagreement expressivism objective truth bivalence truth-aptness assertion|
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Peter Lasersohn (2005). Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Citations of this work BETA
Carl Baker & Jon Robson (2015). An Absolutist Theory of Faultless Disagreement in Aesthetics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):n/a-n/a.
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