Online research in philosophy

H. P. Grice first presented his theory of conversational implicature in “Logic and Conversation.” This theory is comprised of conversational maxims that are based on the Cooperative Principle. Since then, it has become the default theory of implicature in pragmatics. This theory, however, is deeply flawed. Asa Kasher and Wayne Davis present alternative models for conversational implicature, but they both also have shortcomings in their theories. This work attempts to reconcile the Gicean theory of implicature with Kasher’s rationality based theory, and Davis’ theory of implicatures as conventions. The theory presented here creates conversational kinds to distinguish between cooperative conversation and non-cooperative conversation. Conversational implicature is convention based, but the conversational maxims are retained for cooperative conversational kinds. Thus, maxim violations end up as conversational cues informing participants that irrational statements may be better understood within a conventional framework. This provides for the shortcomings of the earlier works, and has greater explanatory power.

This paper argues that modern society does not meet the problems posed by the experience of disease in a satisfactory way. It attempts to show this by examining the distinction between disease and plague. Disease is formulated as necesssarily involving the self in unforeseeable ways with what is other to itself: the challenge of disease is treated as the challenge of this involvement. On the other hand, plague as an abstract threat is that towards which the collective shows principled indifference. The strength and the limits of this indifference are explored. Subsequent upon this, the paper examines the consequences of the loss of the distinction between disease and plague, particularly with respect to the implications of that loss for the treatment, management, and control of disease in modern society.

Preface: What this strange book is about -- Conversation 1: where's the formula? -- Conversation 2: brain and mind -- Conversation 3: logic and intuition -- Conversation 4: how to open the 'third eye' -- Conversation 5: matter and spirit -- Conversation 6: the data -- Conversation 7: synchronicity -- Conversation 8: waves -- Conversation 9: holism -- Conversation 10: the music of the spheres -- Conversation 11: cultural consequences -- Conversation 12: water magic.

The “Asian disease” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) demonstrated behaviour in contradiction to the invariance axiom of EU theory. However, the risky choice behaviour was simply seen by the equate-to-differentiate model as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes. It was then argued that a way in which frame influences choice is through the perceived difference between possible outcomes. A “judgement” task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of “the value difference between each possible outcome and the certain outcome” will permit prediction of preference in the choice pattern related to the Asian disease problem. Participants were exposed to an anthrax disease problem (the original or probabilistic version of the Asian disease problem) and a SARS problem (the fuzzy version of the Asian disease problem). It was shown that the empirical evidence in relation to the Asian disease problem could be satisfactorily accounted for by the generalised weak dominance strategy revealed by the judgement results.

In this paper I demonstrate that the "pain problem" Dartnall claims to have discovered is in fact no problem at all. Dartnall's construction of the apparent problem, I argue, relies on an erroneous assumption of the unity of consciousness, an erroneous assumption of the simplicity of pain as a phenomenon ignoring crucial neurophysiological and neuroanatomical information, a mistaken account of introspective knowledge according to which introspection gives us inner episodes veridically and in their totality and a model of consciousness that depicts the mind as an attic of inner objects towards which attention might or might not be directed. Once these errors are dispelled, no problem remains. None the less, given the seductiveness of these errors, and the havoc they wreak in cognitive science, dispelling them is a worthwhile exercise.

This essay provides an explanation and interpretation of the undertreatment of pain by discussing some of the scientific, clinical, cultural, and philosophical aspects of this problem. One reason why pain continues to be a problem for medicine is that pain does not conform to the scientific approach to health and disease, a philosophy adopted by most health care professionals. Pain does not fit this philosophical perspective because (1) pain is subjective, not objective; (2) the causal basis of pain is often poorly understood; (3) pain is often regarded as a mere symptom, not as a disease; (4) there often are no magic bullets for pain; (5) pain does not fit the expert knowledge model. In order for health care professionals to do a better job of treating pain, some changes need to occur in medical philosophy, education, and practice.

This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain in the tradition of direct realist perceptual theories (e.g., Dretske, Tye) leaves out something crucial about the phenomenology of pain experiences, namely, their affective character. I touch upon the role that introspection plays in such representationalist views, and indicate how it contributes to the source of their trouble vis-à-vis bodily sensations. The paper ends by briefly commenting on the relation between the affective/evaluative component of pain and the hedonic valence of emotions.

This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowledge regarding the neuroanatomy and physiology of pain processing. The third section highlights the recent research by Rainville et al. [(1997) Pain affect encoded in human anterior cingulate but not somatosensory cortex, Science, 277, 968-971], which suggests that pain affect is encoded in the ACC. The final section of the paper spells out exactly how these data affect the causal problem of pain qualia.