Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar

Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):5-21 (2009)
In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.
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DOI 10.5840/pjphil2009311
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Dale Jacquette (2007). Denying The Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ming Hsiung (2013). Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's Paradox and the Liar. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31.

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