Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28 (2000)
|Abstract||Some deflationists about truth maintain that such deflationism undercuts truth-condition theories of meaning. We offer a deductive argument designed to show that meaning must at least include truth-condition. Deflationist replies are considered and rebutted. We conclude that either deflationism is false or it is not, after all, incompatible with truth-condition theories of meaning|
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