Deflationism, meaning and truth-conditions

Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28 (2000)
Abstract
Some deflationists about truth maintain that such deflationism undercuts truth-condition theories of meaning. We offer a deductive argument designed to show that meaning must at least include truth-condition. Deflationist replies are considered and rebutted. We conclude that either deflationism is false or it is not, after all, incompatible with truth-condition theories of meaning
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Citations of this work BETA
Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300.
Keith Simmons (2006). Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):196–205.

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