David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):337-355 (2009)
abstract In this paper I develop a characterization of disability according to which disability is in no way a sub-optimal feature. I argue, however, that this conception of disability is compatible with the idea that having a disability is, at least in a restricted sense, a harm. I then go on to argue that construing disability in this way avoids many of the common objections levelled at accounts which claim that disability is not a negative feature.
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Citations of this work BETA
Claire Edwards (2013). The Anomalous Wellbeing of Disabled People: A Response. Topoi 32 (2):189-196.
Cynthia A. Stark (2013). Luck, Opportunity and Disability. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (3):383-402.
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