Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 63 (1):49-64 (1996)
|Abstract||In order to judge whether a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable records of past measurement results that can be compared against the predictions of the theory. Some formulations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy this condition. The standard theory without the collapse postulate is an example. Bell's reading of Everett's relative-state formulation is another. Furthermore, there are formulations of quantum mechanics that only satisfy this condition for a special class of observers, formulations whose empirical adequacy could only be judged by an observer who records her measurement results in a special way. Bohm's theory is an example. It is possible to formulate hidden-variable theories that do not suffer from such a restriction, but these encounter other problems|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Maxwell (1976). Towards a Micro Realistic Version of Quantum Mechanics, Part I. Foundations of Physics 6 (3):275-292.
Valia Allori & Nino Zanghi (2008). On the Classical Limit of Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Physics 10.1007/S10701-008-9259-4 39 (1):20-32.
Frederick M. Kronz (1998). Bohm's Ontological Interpretation and its Relations to Three Formulations of Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 117 (1):31-52.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (2005). Relativistic Quantum Mechanics Through Frame-Dependent Constructions. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):802-813.
C. Lehner (1997). What It Feels Like to Be in a Superposition, and Why: Consciousness and the Interpretation of Everett's Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 110 (2):191-216.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (1994). The Suggestive Properties of Quantum Mechanics Without the Collapse Postulate. Erkenntnis 41 (2):233 - 252.
Jeffrey Barrett, Everett's Relative-State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #213,863 of 739,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?