Graduate studies at Western
Mind 121 (482):fzs055 (forthcoming)
|Abstract||In deciding whether to read this paper, it might seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (i) that, if you read this paper, you will become a better person. It might also seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (ii) that, if you were to read this paper, you would become a better person. Is there a difference between (i) and (ii)? If so, are you rationally required to base your decision on your confidence in one of the two conditionals, rather than the other? Keith DeRose (2010) proposes a provocative pair of answers to these questions. In this paper, I argue that DeRose’s answers are incorrect, and I defend a rival pair of answers|
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