Philosophical Studies 147 (1):123 - 137 (2010)
|Abstract||Skyrms-Lewis signaling games illustrate how meaningful language may evolve from initially meaningless random signals (Lewis, Convention 1969; Skyrms 2008). Here we will consider how incommensurable languages might evolve in the context of signaling games. We will also consider the types of incommensurability exhibited between evolved languages in such games. We will find that sequentially evolved languages may be strongly incommensurable while still allowing for increasingly faithful descriptions of the world|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jeffrey Barrett & Kevin J. S. Zollman, The Role of Forgetting in the Evolution and Learning of Language.
Aaron Sloman, Spatial Prepositions as Higher Order Functions: And Implications of Grice's Theory for Evolution of Language.
Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66 (3):409 - 436.
Hin-Chung E. Hung (1987). Incommensurability and Inconsistency of Languages. Erkenntnis 27 (3):323 - 352.
Jeffrey A. Barrett, Numerical Simulations of the Lewis Signaling Game: Learning Strategies, Pooling Equilibria, and the Evolution of Grammar.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (2007). Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):527-546.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (2009). The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games. Theory and Decision 67 (2):223-237.
Added to index2009-04-10
Total downloads32 ( #43,395 of 722,780 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?