Grounding the mental

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105 (1978)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Belief  Identity Theory  Individual  Mentalism  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Functionalism  Intention  Reductionism
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DOI 10.2307/2107032
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