Idiolectal error

Mind and Language 16 (3):263–283 (2001)
A linguistic theory is correct exactly to the extent that it is the explicit statement of a body of knowledge possessed by a designated language-user. This popular psychological conception of the goal of linguistic theorizing is commonly paired with a preference for idiolectal over social languages, where it seems to be in the nature of idiolects that the beliefs one holds about one’s own are ipso facto correct. Unfortunately, it is also plausible that the correctness of a genuine belief cannot consist merely in that belief’s being held. This paper considers how best to eliminate this tension.
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00169
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John M. Collins (2005). Faculty Disputes. Mind and Language 19 (5):503-33.

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