Is there a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness?

Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188 (2007)
It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
Keywords Intentionality  Consciousness  Searle  Aspectual shape  Subjectivity
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-007-0007-8
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