Online research in philosophy

In this paper we deal with two types of reasoning: induction, and deduction First, we present a unified computational model of deductive reasoning through models, where deduction occurs in five phases: Construction, Integration, Conclusion, Falsification, and Response. Second, we make an attempt, to analyze induction through the same phases. Our aim is an explorative evaluation of the mental processes possibly shared by deductive and inductive reasoning.

Perruchet and Vinter stop short of fully embracing the implications of their own SOC framework and hence end up defending an implausible perspective on consciousness. We suggest instead that consciousness should be viewed as a graded dimension defined over quality of representation. This graded perspective eliminates the most problematic aspects of the cognitive unconscious without denying its existence altogether.

The self-organizing consciousness (SOC) is not sufficient to account for young children's ability to acquire complex rules and word-object mappings. First, the attention-association cycles suggested by the SOC are unlikely to happen because recurrence of particular stimulus properties usually disengages the attention of an observer. Second, “primitive processors” preinstalled in the system make the SOC unnecessarily complex.

This article reports on a study of children's deductive reasoning in solving novel relational problems. Detailed protocols were obtained from 264 children (aged 9- 12 years) who verbalised their thinking as they solved the problems. The study included the development of a three-phase theory based on Johnson-Laird and Byrne's mental models perspective, but with some distinct modifications. These include a focus on the relational complexity entailed in model construction and in premise integration, and the advancement of four reasoning principles that are applied throughout problem solution (in contrast to Johnson-Laird's falsification processes as the hallmark of deductive reasoning). The reported case studies and the results of statistical analyses supported predictions arising from the proposed theory, including the key role of the reasoning principles. The results also showed that problem difficulty is a function of relational complexity, not of the number of models to be constructed, as argued by Johnson-Laird and Byrne.

Contrary to Perruchet & Vinter's self-organizing consciousness (SOC) model, subliminal mere exposure (SME) research indicates that stimuli perceived without awareness produce robust effects. Moreover, SME effects are significantly stronger than mere exposure effects produced by clearly recognized stimuli. The SOC model must be revised to accommodate findings from studies that use affect-based outcome measures.

Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991; 1993) present a theory of human deductive reasoning based on the notion of mental models. Unfortunately, the theory is incomplete. The present commentary argues that pragmatic considerations, particularly of the type discussed in Sperber and Wilson (1995), can complement the theory.

Mental model theory has been used to explain many differing phenomena in adult reasoning, including the extensively studied case of conditional reasoning. However, the current theory makes predictions about the development of conditional reasoning that are not consistent with data. In this article, young children's performance on conditional reasoning problems and the justifications given are analysed. A mental model account of conditional reasoning is proposed that assumes that (1) young children can reason with two models and (2) the fleshing out of conditionals involves activation of information in semantic memory that uses the minor premise as a retrieval cue.

We propose that the isomorphism generally observed between the representations composing our momentary phenomenal experience and the structure of the world is the end-product of a progressive organization that emerges thanks to elementary associative processes that take our conscious representations themselves as the stuff on which they operate, a thesis that we summarize in the concept of Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC). Key Words: Associative learning; automatism; consciousness; development; implicit learning; incubation; language; mental representation; perception; phenomenal experience.

Through the concept of self-organizing consciousness (SOC), we posit that the dynamic of the mind stems from the recurrent interplay between the properties of conscious experiences and the properties of the world, hence making it unnecessary to postulate the existence of an unconscious mental level. In contrast, arguments are provided by commentators for the need for a functional level of organization located between the neural and the conscious. Other commentaries challenge us concerning the ability of our model to account for specific phenomena in the domains of language, reasoning, incubation, and creativity. The possibility of unconscious semantic access and other alleged instances of adapted performance in the absence of any conscious counterpart are also put forth as evidence against our view. Our response emphasizes the fact that opponents to our model often present as factual, theory-free evidence which is in fact nothing more than the postulates underlying the classical computational framework.