Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34 (2009)
|Abstract||On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of indeterminacy nor a type of ignorance. Rather, it is sui generis.|
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