Oracles, aesthetics, and bayesian consensus

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):280 (1996)
In order for Bayesian inquiry to count as objective, one might argue that it must lead to a consensus among those who use it and share evidence, but presumably this is not enough. It has been proposed that one should also require that the consensus be reached from very different initial opinions by conditioning only on basic experimental evidence, evidence free from subjective, social, or psychological influence. I will argue here, however, that this notion of objectivity in Bayesian inquiry is too narrow.
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DOI 10.1086/289961
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