David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98 (1999)
How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person
|Keywords||Becoming Metaphysics Person Psychology Science Rogers, C|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jukka Varelius (2009). Minimally Conscious State and Human Dignity. Neuroethics 2 (1):35-50.
James M. Dow (2012). On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Consciousness, the Symmetry Thesis and Person Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):1-27.
Jack Martin (2011). The Interactivist Social Ontology of Persons: A Descriptive and Evaluative Synthesis, with Two Suggestions. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 21 (1):173-183.
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