Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311 (2008)
|Abstract||Abstract: The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal covariation theory is in deeper trouble over Inverted Earth than is generally supposed even by the theory's detractors.|
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