On the Faithful Interpretation of Pure Wave Mechanics

Given Hugh Everett III's understanding of the proper cognitive status of physical theories, his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics arguably qualifies as an empirically acceptable physical theory. The argument turns on the precise nature of the relationship that Everett requires between the empirical substructure of an empirically faithful physical theory and experience. On this view, Everett provides a weak resolution to both the determinate record and the probability problems encountered by pure wave mechanics, and does so in a way that avoids unnecessary metaphysical complications. Taking Everett's goal to be showing the empirical faithfulness of the relative-state formulation agrees well with his characterization of his project as one of seeking a model for observation in the correlation structure described by pure wave mechanics and seeking a measure of typicality over this empirical substructure that covaries with our empirically warranted expectations. 1 Pure Wave Mechanics and Relative States2 Everett and Frank3 Everett on the Nature of Physical Theories4 Conditions for Empirical Faithfulness5 The Empirical Faithfulness of Pure Wave Mechanics6 Conclusion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axr004
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,938
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Barrett (2011). Everett's Pure Wave Mechanics and the Notion of Worlds. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):277-302.
Richard Dawid & Karim P. Y. Thébault (2014). Against the Empirical Viability of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett Approach to Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:55-61.
Brett Maynard Bevers (2011). Everett's “Many-Worlds” Proposal. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 42 (1):3-12.
Arthur J. Cunningham (2014). Branches in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):247-262.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

88 ( #32,569 of 1,725,631 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #93,214 of 1,725,631 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.