British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47 (1998)
|Abstract||A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent credibility. I address various objections to the weighted averaging technique and conclude that the technique is a promising one in various respects|
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