Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):407-444 (2007)
|Abstract||I propose the first strictly compositional semantic account of same. New data, including especially NP-internal uses such as two men with the same name, suggests that same in its basic use is a quantificational element taking scope over nominals. Given type-lifting as a generally available mechanism, I show that this follows naturally from the fact that same is an adjective. Independently-motivated assumptions extend the analysis to standard examples such as Anna and Bill read the same book via a mechanism I call PARASITIC SCOPE, in which the scope of same depends on the scope of some other scopetaking element in the sentence. Although I will initially discuss the analysis in terms of a familiar Quantifier Raising framework, I go on to implement the analysis within an innovative continuation-based Type-Logical Grammar. The empirical payoff for dealing in continuations is that a simple generalization of the basic analysis gives the first ever formal account of cases in which same distributes over objects other than NP denotations, as in the relevant interpretation of John hit and killed the same man.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Saul A. Kripke (2005). Russell's Notion of Scope. Mind 114 (456):1005-1037.
Ron Artstein (2005). Quantificational Arguments in Temporal Adjunct Clauses. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (5):541 - 597.
Anna Szabolcsi (2010). Quantification. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas E. Patton (1978). Replies and Discussion on Strawson' Substitute for Scope. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):291-304.
Thomas E. Patton (1978). On Strawson' Substitute for Scope. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):291 - 304.
Adrian Brasoveanu, Structured Anaphora to Quantifier Domains: A Unified Account of Quantificational & Modal Subordination and Exceptional Wide Scope.
Chung-Chieh Shan & Chris Barker (2006). Explaining Crossover and Superiority as Left-to-Right Evaluation. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):91 - 134.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #106,196 of 549,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?