Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously: An objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437 (1991)
|Abstract||Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. In this short paper I argue that Rottschaefer and Martinsen's solution fails. If one takes moral properties to supervene on non-moral properties, then either one ends up committing one of the two forms of the naturalistic fallacy or else one is left postulating unbelievable brute metaphysical facts.|
|Keywords||Ethics evolution evolutionary ethics M. Ruse naturalistic fallacy supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2011). Does Semantic Naturalism Rest on a Mistake? In Nuccetelli & Seay Susana & Gary (ed.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen (1990). Really Taking Darwin Seriously: An Alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian Metaethics. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):149-173.
Peter Woolcock (1993). Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 8 (4):423-439.
William A. Rottschaefer (1997). Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber's the Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):369-384.
Julia Tanner (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 13.
David Sloan Wilson, Eric Dietrich & Anne B. Clark (2003). On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology. Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):669-81.
Andrew J. Kerr (2000). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Environmental Ethics and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Environmental Ethics 22 (1):85-99.
Burton frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality, with Regard to the Naturalistic Fallacy. London, Allen & Unwin.
Alvin Plantinga (2010). Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience. Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):247-272.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #68,535 of 755,029 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,372 of 755,029 )
How can I increase my downloads?