Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1987)
From the Editor’s Introduction: THE INTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. The limitations in view here are not due to the mere finitude of our understanding of ourselves and of the world in which we live. They are limitations that come automatically and necessarily with any form of understanding. They are, as we shall see, part and parcel of any organization or ordering of data that we call information. The consequences of these limitations are varied: As a result of them, hermeneutics cannot help but be hermetic; scientific theories of necessity are circumscribed by the boundaries of the ideas that define them; formal systems must choose between consistency and comprehensiveness; philosophical study, because it includes itself within its own proper subject matter, is forced to be reflexive in its self-enclosure. The fundamental dynamic shared by all forms of understanding testifies to an internal limitative keystone.
|Keywords||reflexivity theory of reference semantical self-reference pragmatical self-reference metalogical self-reference|
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|Call number||BD450.S3934 1987|
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John L. Casti (2000). The Inside Story on Systems, Minds, and Mechanisms. Complexity 5 (3):10-13.
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