Seeing Through Self-Deception

New York: Cambridge University Press (1997)
Abstract
What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias, and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief.
Keywords Consciousness  Ethics  Irrationality  Metaphysics  Self-deception
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Call number BD439.B37 1997
ISBN(s) 0521620147   0521038774   9780521620147   9780521038775
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Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
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