Truth and conventional implicature

Mind 112 (445):1-34 (2003)
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Abstract

Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic content of a sentence is not given simply by its truth-conditional content. So not all instances of the T-schema are assertable in the relevant sense. Consequently, there is a strong case to be made against truth-conditional semantics of the disquotational variety and deflationism about truth.

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Stephen Barker
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Implicature.Wayne Davis - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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