Towards an intuitionist account of moral development

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547 (2005)
Abstract
Sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
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András Szigeti (2012). No Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):845-862.
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