Online research in philosophy

Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.

Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.

In a recent book (The Metaphysics within Physics), Tim Maudlin reconstructs metaphysics by taking inspiration from the gauge theories interpreted in the ber bundle framework. I call his project the "fiber bundle metaphysics". Primarily targeted not to Humean Supervenience, but to any metaphysics employing the relation of resemblance among objects (D. Lewis, D. Armstrong), Maudlin's project is novel and promising. I critically analyze the arguments by identifying several objections stemming rst from metaphysics. The metaphysician questions whether gauge theory represented through ber bundles is apt to reform metaphysics. It needs, I claim, a rmer commitment to realism. Second, she cannot see how Maudlin accommodates the metaphysical "loneliness" of objects in the ber bundle metaphysics and complains that the mathematical structures of the ber bundle metaphysics are weakly discernible only. A second class of objections stems from the physics of gauge theories. I see a "conventional" solution to Maudlin's path-dependency argument against Lewis's "pure metaphysical relations": other invariants of affine connections can play the role of internal properties and relations. I raise an objection and address it regarding the duality of the ber bundle representation which is deeply divided among two types of bundles, corresponding to dierent ontologies: gauge elds and spacetime dieomorphism. Several possible paths towards more realistic interpretations of the ber bundle are briefy discussed. Finally, I bring in the provlem of locality, separability and I emphasize some criticisms. My conclusion is that Mauldin's project is assuring, but not powerful enough to reform metaphysics.

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.

Tim Maudlin's argument for the inconsistency of Cramer's Transactional Interpretation (TI) of quantum theory has been considered in some detail by Joseph Berkovitz, who has provided a possible solution to this challenge at the cost of a significant empirical lacuna on the part of TI. The present paper proposes an alternative solution in which Maudlin's charge of inconsistency is evaded but at no cost of empirical content on the part of TI. However, Maudlin's argument is taken as ruling out Cramer's heuristic "pseudotime" explanation of the realization of one transaction out of many.

Tim Maudlin’s argument for the inconsistency of Cramer’s Transactional Interpretation (TI) of quantum theory has been considered in some detail by Joseph Berkovitz, who has provided a possible solution to this challenge at the cost of a significant empirical lacuna on the part of TI. The present paper proposes an alternative solution in which Maudlin’s charge of inconsistency is evaded but at no cost of empirical content on the part of TI. However, Maudlin’s argument is taken as ruling out Cramer’s heuristic “pseudotime” explanation of the realization of one transaction out of many.

Maudlin’s “On the Passing of Time” suggests a pairing not often found in the metaphysics of time: eternalism (i.e. that the past, present, and future are all equally real) and Absolute Becoming, the view that the passage of time brings new events into existence. Maudlin's pairing begs the question of what, given eternalism, could Absolute Becoming mean in a block universe, a question to which Maudlin does not provide a clear answer. Therefore, we consider two classic accounts of Absolute Becoming, those of C.D. Broad and Howard Stein, to determine the extent to which either may realize Maudlin's goal of a union between eternalism and Absolute Becoming. Our analysis finds Stein’s account more accommodating than Broad's to not only eternalism but also special relativity; however, there is a giant gap between the kind of Absolute Becoming that we seem to experience (and which motivates Maudlin) and Stein's Absolute Becoming. While it isn't clear what account of Absolute Becoming Maudlin has in mind, we conclude that there is no extant conception of Absolute Becoming that can answer to the experience of becoming that motivates Maudlin.

Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict with the very intuitive thesis that conscious experience supervenes on physical activity. Klein in Synthese 165:141–153, ( 2008 ) proposes a way for computationalists about experience to avoid panpsychism while still respecting the supervenience of experience on activity. I argue that his attempt to save computational theories of experience from Maudlin’s and Bishop’s critique fails.