David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 74 (5):654-665 (2007)
This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed. ‡I'm grateful to Rob Wilson, Alex Rueger and Lindley Darden for important comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Nagel, Heather Proctor, Ken Bond, members of the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group, and audience members at the November 2006 meeting of the PSA, for helpful comments or discussion. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada fellowship 752-2005-1208 supported research. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
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References found in this work BETA
Jason M. Baker (2005). Adaptive Speciation: The Role of Natural Selection in Mechanisms of Geographic and Non-Geographic Speciation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):303-326.
Berit Brogaard (2004). Species as Individuals. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):223-242.
Marc Ereshefsky (1988). Axiomatics and Individuality: A Reply to Williams' "Species Are Individuals". Philosophy of Science 55 (3):427-434.
Marc Ereshefsky (1991). Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution. Philosophy of Science 58 (1):84-101.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew J. Barker & Joel D. Velasco (2014). Deep Conventionalism About Evolutionary Groups. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):971-982.
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