Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 144 (2):281 - 296 (2009)
|Abstract||I aim to show that standard theories of counterfactuals are mistaken, not in detail, but in principle, and I aim to say what form a tenable theory must take. Standard theories entail a categorical interpretation of counterfactuals, on which to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state something, not relative to any supposition or hypothesis, but categorically. On the rival suppositional interpretation, to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state that it would be that C relative to the supposition that it were that A. The two interpretations make incompatible predictions concerning the correct evaluation of counterfactuals. I argue that the suppositional interpretation makes the correct prediction.|
|Keywords||Counterfactuals Conditionals Subjunctive conditionals|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Morteza Dehghani, Rumen Iliev & Stefan Kaufmann (2012). Causal Explanation and Fact Mutability in Counterfactual Reasoning. Mind and Language 27 (1):55-85.
S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Douglas Kutach (2002). The Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):82-104.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Sungho Choi (2005). Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):495–503.
S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.
Ivar Hannikainen (2011). Might-Counterfactuals and the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. Disputatio 4 (30):127-149.
Igal Kvart (1994). Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge. Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #71,246 of 739,318 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,318 )
How can I increase my downloads?