The open future: Bivalence, determinism and ontology

Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
Keywords Open future  Metaphysical indeterminacy  Logical fatalism  Determinism  Growing block
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References found in this work BETA
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
Berit Brogaard (2008). Sea Battle Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):326–335.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.

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