The pleonasticity of talk about concepts

Philosophical Studies 89 (1):53-86 (1998)
The paper aims to disarm arguments, prevalent in diverse philosophical contexts, that deny the legitimacy of attributions of propositional attitudes on the grounds that the putative subject lacks one or more of the requite concepts. Its strategy is to offer and defend an extremely minimal account on concept possession. The agenda of the paper broadens into a defence of the thesis that concepts are a linguistic epiphenomenon: talk about them emerges as the result of certain contingently available and pleonastic ways of talking about propositional attitudes
Keywords Concept  Language  Proposition  Sentence  Word
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004243324577
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