Graduate studies at Western
Process Studies 38 (2):189-206 (2009)
|Abstract||For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibilityof special, “experiential” properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus it may turn out that the elusiveness of feeling is essential to its functionality|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Kirk (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Wei Zhang (2011). Person und Selbstgefühl im phänomenologischen Personalismus Max Schelers. Studia Phaenomenologica 11:265-284.
Richard Dien Winfield (2011). The Living Mind: From Psyche to Consciousness. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
M. K. Spehn & L. M. Reder (2000). The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):187-192.
David Papineau (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
Mohan Matthen (2010). Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of Presence. In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press.
Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy.
Melissa Zinkin (2012). Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”. Inquiry 55 (5):433-453.
Stuart N. Hampshire (1952). The Analogy of Feeling. Mind 61 (January):1-12.
Thomas C. Dalton (1998). The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap''. J:Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). The Feeling of Being. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):43-60.
Somogy Varga (2013). Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.
A. Koriat (2000). The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.
Steven Ravett Brown (2000). Reply to Bruce Mangan's Commentary on “What Feeling Is the 'Feeling of Knowing?'”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):545-549.
Stevan Harnad (2001). Editorial Commentary. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):973-974.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads4 ( #189,051 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?