The persistence of memory: Surreal trajectories in Bohm's theory

Philosophy of Science 67 (4):680-703 (2000)
In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm's theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm's theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm's theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm's theory and relativity. They also provide a striking example of the theory-ladenness of observation
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DOI 10.1086/392861
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Benjamin Feintzeig (2014). Can the Ontological Models Framework Accommodate Bohmian Mechanics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48:59-67.
Wayne C. Myrvold (2003). On Some Early Objections to Bohm's Theory. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):7 – 24.

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