Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92 (2008)
|Abstract||I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.|
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