David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401 (2013)
Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism.
|Keywords||Presentism Truthmaking Supervenience|
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References found in this work BETA
Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Molly Gardner (2016). Beneficence and Procreation. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
Sam Baron (2013). Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists? Theoria 79 (3):153-173.
Giuliano Torrengo (2014). Ostrich Presentism. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.
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