Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401 (2013)
Abstract
Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism
Keywords Presentism  Truthmaking  Supervenience
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Giuliano Torrengo (2014). Ostrich Presentism. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.
Similar books and articles
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Rafael De Clercq (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.
Ulrich Meyer (2005). The Presentist's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225.
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