The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws

Analysis 72 (4):714-723 (2012)
Alexander Bird argues that David Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford and Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
Keywords Dispositional Essentialism  Causation  Laws  Alexander Bird
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans114
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