|Abstract||The two standard theories of vagueness—vagueness-as-ignorance and vagueness-asindeterminacy—agree on the following principle: if you are certain that it is clearly vague whether p, then you clearly should not believe p and you clearly should not believe not-p. I argue against the principle, and thus against the two standard theories. I offer an explanation of the initial appeal of the principle. And I show how a rival principle helps to better explain a recalcitrant trio of widely accepted data.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Terence Horgan (1998). The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):313-330.
Timothy Williamson (2002). Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error. Acta Analytica 17 (1):47-61.
Rosanna Keefe (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press.
David Barnett (2009). Is Vagueness Sui Generis ? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
Matti Eklund (2005). What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
D. Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
David Barnett (2011). Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #62,609 of 722,682 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,273 of 722,682 )
How can I increase my downloads?